This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee is called to order. We are privileged to have today two

distinguished panels, and we will ask that the members respect the

fact that Secretary Armitage must leave by 11:15. So at the conclusion

of his statement, we will gauge the number of members who

have appeared and try to make a calculation, in terms of questioning

time, so that each member will have an opportunity and,

at the same time, the Secretary can meet his important commitments.

Likewise, it is important that we proceed in a way in which

we have ample time for our distinguished second panel, because

members will want to question them.

Senator Biden is detained for the moment. And when he arrives,

the Chair will recognize him for his opening statement. I will make

an opening statement at this point and then recognize Secretary

Armitage.

This is the first of a number of hearings pertaining to the Korean

Peninsula. In future hearings, we will review food assistance,

human rights concerns, economic reforms, peninsula reunification,

and other pertinent issues. Today’s hearing will review weapons of

mass destruction [WMD] on the Korean Peninsula.

In recent weeks, following admissions of North Korean officials

of their uranium-enrichment program, in violation of the Agreed

Framework of 1994 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the

level of public exchange between North Korea and the United

States has reached a new intensity.

Unfortunately, we have been at this juncture before. And in

1994, North Korea was removing spent fuel, which could be reprocessed

for use in nuclear weapons. Negotiation of the Agreed Framework

brought a halt to immediate prospects for war.

In 1998, North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japan.

And while the United States had become distracted by other international

issues, North Korea remained focused on its nuclear pro-

gram. It appears that maintenance of the Agreed Framework became

policy in itself, its fragility demonstrated by the 1998 missile

launch by North Korea.

Last year, I outlined some of my thoughts regarding the vulnerability

of the United States to the use of weapons of mass destruction,

whether from terrorist organizations or from rogue nations. I

stand by my premise that every nation—every nation—which has

weapons and materials of mass destruction, must account for what

it has, spend its own money or obtain international technical and

financial resources to safely secure what it has, and pledge that no

other nation, cell or cause will be allowed access or use. A satisfactory

level of accountability, transparency, and safety must be established

in every nation with a weapon of mass destruction program.

When nations resist accountability, or when they make their territory

available to terrorists who are seeking weapons of mass destruction,

our nation must be prepared to use force as well as all

diplomatic and economic tools at our disposal.

This doctrine, which I espouse, also applies to North Korea.

While the United States is and should be prepared to use force related

to North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, we must guarantee

to the American public and to Americans serving in Korea,

that all diplomatic options are being pursued. The stakes are high.

We must not discount the horrific consequences to American, Korean,

and perhaps Japanese lives resulting from a misunderstanding

or a miscalculation on the part of either side.

I would like to recall a partial text of a joint statement that Senator

Sam Nunn of Georgia, and I issued in 1994 as part of a Summary

of Findings and Recommendations regarding the crisis at

that time. And our quote, ‘‘Our policymaking and coordination with

our allies, the timing of our statements and our actions, our responses

to developments on the Korean Peninsula, and our communication

with our diplomatic and military leaders in the field must

all be sharpened and strengthened in the days and weeks ahead.

Korean developments must be the subject of clear, frequent focus

by top Clinton Administration officials, including the President.

The United States should designate a single senior official with access

to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of

Defense to help develop and coordinate United States policy and

action on Korea. We must speak with one voice on this sensitive

matter,’’ end of quote.

This recommendation, in my judgment, still applies today. While

Americans have been deeply concerned about the war with—potential

war with Iraq, many have also considered the Korean crisis a

more serious situation. In fact, both are very serious, both are very

dangerous, and both need our full attention.

It is apparent that North Korea has taken several provocative actions

recently, including steps which could lead to production of nuclear

weapons in the next few months. I believe that United States

officials should talk to North Korean officials about ending North

Korean nuclear weapons programs with provisions of comprehensive

international inspections to ensure a successful clean-up procedure.

North Korea may mention in these talks its desire for nonaggression

guarantees, potential commercial relations with other coun-

tries, and urgent humanitarian food and fuel contributions through

international agencies to assist the North Korean people. We

should be prepared to talk to North Korea about all of this.

I ask the administration to address promptly not only the importance

of international multiparty diplomacy with North Korea, but

the importance of immediate United States leadership, including

direct talks between the United States and North Korea.

It is a pleasure, as always, to have you before

the committee, Secretary Armitage, and will you please proceed

with your testimony.

Well, thank you very much.

For the moment we will have a first round with 5 minutes and

ask the timekeeper to start on my time at this moment, and we

will go back and forth on both sides of the aisle.

Secretary Armitage, the description you have made of our diplomacy

is not only accurate, but it shows its vigor. And my quarrel

would not be with any of the steps that you have taken. It just appears,

as I had indicated in my opening statement, that other nations

are prepared to be helpful, some more so, apparently, than

others, and we would like to have an international solution and a

group around the table because of the proximity of the neighbors,

the danger to them, or the potential good that might come from

better relations.

There is a need for direct talks between the United States and

North Korea. And at least I believe that we ought to discuss with

the North Koreans the issues that, unfortunately, did not get discussed

with Secretary Kelly’s mission, which they might have discussed.

It was fully appropriate they be apprised of our knowledge

that they had a program going. Perhaps we should have not been

surprised, but we were. But, in any event, not much else occurred

during that meeting. I would hope it might be resumed, and the

reason being that it appears that, otherwise, while we are very

much engaged in diplomacy in the Iraq situation and elsewhere

around the world with the war on terror, North Korea may simply

be on hold—at least that is an impression that many Senators

have, a hope that somehow nothing precipitous occurs. But the

North Koreans understand that, apparently, and, therefore, announce

actions periodically, and we are left, it seems to me, in a

more difficult situation without an appreciable change on the part

of the Chinese or the Russians.

Perhaps, as you talk to the emissary today from the new President,

there may be plans of activity there that are suggested, and

we certainly welcome that emissary’s coming to the United States.

Let me just, without pursuing that, ask one more question, and

that is, What is the value of encouraging other nations to receive

North Korean refugees? Specifically, there are a great number of

people in anguish in North Korea. They take desperate measures

to leave that country. It is apparent that the Chinese are taking

equally vigorous measures to keep them in.

It has been apparent for a long time that South Korean friends

have said to us, ‘‘Hang on. If, in fact, all of the North Koreans who

want to unite with us come to South Korea now, it will be very upsetting

to our economy, to our politics. We want North Korea reformed

inside of North Korea without too many others with us, despite

our kinship with North Korean brothers.’’

It is not clear that the United States has been particularly eager

to see North Korean refugees here, or made provision for that. But

my question today, without being hopelessly provocative, is, why

not? Why do we not recognize—and the parallels are not precise or

the same—that much happened in Europe when people began to

come out of East Germany to West Germany or out of Hungary, out

of Poland, out of behind the Iron Curtain. This was a major factor

in the change of life and the change of negotiations and politics. It

recognized freedom and the fact that people who are suffering deserve

a chance to live.

So I would just respectfully ask, even as you are considering the

tough question of direct talks, which is a difficult one, to be thinking

about how we encourage countries, including our own, to think

about receiving North Koreans who may come out seeking freedom.

I think that might change the equation and the conversations.

I thank you for that response. Senator Feingold.

Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Let me mention, as I should have earlier, that mention has been

made of the diplomacy of Assistant Secretary Jim Kelly, and he is

immediately behind the Secretary, and I will call upon you, Mr.

Secretary, to ask him to help you whenever you need to. But we

are appreciative of your being here and of your service to your country.

I call now on Senator Hagel.

Thank you, Senator Hagel. Senator Boxer.

Thank you very much, Senator Boxer. Senator Chafee.

Thank you, Senator Chafee. Senator Biden.

So ordered. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Why don’t you proceed to answer the question?

Thank you very much, Senator Biden. Senator Allen.

Thank you very much, Senator Allen.

Some members have arrived, some have left, since we began the

hearing. Let me just indicate that Secretary Armitage will be leaving

us at about 11:15. Therefore the Chair, and now with the concurrence

of the ranking member, has declared a 5-minute question

time for each member, and each is being recognized in order of seniority.

I mention that because of, well, fairness issues and timeliness issues.

And I want to call now on Senator Sarbanes.

Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes. Senator Alexander.

Thank you very much, Senator Alexander. Senator Dodd.

Well, certainly, those requests, including my

own, were conveyed to the Secretary. A decision was made that the

Secretary will brief the chairman, me, Senator Biden, the ranking

member, our counterparts in the House committee, and leadership

of the Senate, ten Members of the Congress and the House in all,

at 7 o’clock tomorrow morning at the White House before Secretary

Powell flies to the United Nations.

Secretary Powell will, in fact, be in New York,

but the President will conduct the briefing?

Thank you very much, Senator Dodd. Senator Sununu.

Thank you very much, Senator Sununu. Senator Rockefeller.

We’ll go momentarily to Senator Corzine, then back to Senator Rockefeller.

Thank you very much, Senator Corzine. Senator Rockefeller.

Thank you, Senator Rockefeller.

It is 11:15, and we appreciate very much your time, Mr. Secretary.

Likewise, on Thursday. You were very generous for over 31⁄2

hours discussing Iraq. We look forward to your return.

I would just say, parenthetically, that a comment

has been made about taking the temperature of Capitol Hill and

the Senate and our views, and I think that is important. Literally,

if the thought that our negotiations, in some way, are inhibited by

an informal vote count that the end result of this might not pass

muster, that’s a serious issue.

My guess is, listening at least to the 13 colleagues who have addressed

you this morning, that we are very concerned about the

success of diplomacy, and specifically the diplomacy of our govern-

ment and strongly backing what you and Secretary Kelly, others

who may be in the field, are attempting to do. So please stay closely

in touch, as I know you always do.

But I just make this comment having at least caught the drift

that perhaps Capitol Hill was an obstacle to this. I think, for the

moment, we are intent upon seeing this as a very serious, very

dangerous problem, without arguing its equivalence with Iraq or

other issues, something that really has to be seized. And we appreciate

your description of how you’re doing that. Senator Biden.

A high compliment, well deserved. Thank you very much.

We call now upon our distinguished panel of Ashton Carter, Stephen

Bosworth, and Donald Gregg to come to the witness table.

Gentlemen, we’re very pleased that you are with us today. Let

me introduce this panel more completely. And I will ask you to testify

in the order that I introduce you and to please limit your initial

testimony to 10 minutes, if possible, and then we’ll proceed

with questions of our Senate colleagues.

The first to testify will be the Honorable Ashton B. Carter, who

is now co-director of the Preventive Defense Project. He is former

Assistant Secretary of Defense, and professor of Science and International

Affairs at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

And let me just say, as a point of personal privilege, Ash Carter

was instrumental in providing to Sam Nunn and to me and to

other Senators information with regard to Russian nuclear weapons,

weapons of mass destruction, that formed the foundation for

our legislation that has become known as the Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program, and Ash Carter, himself, helped administrator

that program in the Defense Department. It’s a real privilege to

have him here before us today.

Our next witness will be the Honorable Stephen Bosworth, who

is now dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts

University. He is the former United States Ambassador to the Republic

of Korea, and, equally importantly, in my judgment, our

former Ambassador to the Philippines, and was the instrumental

official at the time of the Philippine election of 1986 in working

with Secretary Schultz, with the President of the United States,

and with the visiting American delegation that witnessed that election.

Let me say that our third witness—and he has temporarily left

us, but he will return, I suspect, shortly—is Donald Gregg, who is

president and chairman of the Korea Society. He is our former

United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and former Security

Advisor to Vice President George Bush.

Gentlemen, we welcome you, and we look forward to your comments. Secretary Carter.

Thank you very much, Dr. Carter, for that very important testimony.

I understand that the witnesses have conferred and that Ambassador

Gregg should proceed at this point. And so I recognize you,

Ambassador. We’re delighted that you are here with us.

It will be placed in the record in full. Substantial.

Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Gregg,

and I express, I am sure, the feeling of all the members of my committee

to you and your colleagues at the table that you have been

important friends of the South Koreans and, likewise, important

interlocutors with the North. And we appreciate the wisdom from

those experiences you’ve just told so well. Ambassador Bosworth.

Thank you very much, Ambassador Bosworth.

Let me commence my line of questioning by indicating that we

welcome the special envoy of the incoming President of South

Korea, who is here visiting with Secretary Powell this morning,

even as we speak. It will be my privilege to see him this afternoon,

and I look forward to that opportunity. He will be seeing other Senators,

I am certain.

And in those conversations, I hope that we will be able to convey

to the incoming President, as well to the outgoing President, that

we are good listeners, we are partners, and we are strong allies,

but, likewise, try to discover, as all three of you tried to illuminate,

what has gone wrong in the relationship, because it is extremely

important that relationship be made stronger and very, very

promptly, in terms of the interests of our two countries as well as

others who are counting upon us, the South Korean responsibility

being that which you have talked about, and ours, likewise.

I think the chairman and I and others today have tried to emphasize

our feeling that direct talks between North Korea and the

United States are important and urgent. And Secretary Armitage

pointed out that we have been waiting for the new administration

to come in, to get its feel of the situation, and so forth. But as Secretary

Carter pointed out, while that wait proceeds, so may the nuclear

proliferation threat which he has described so accurately and

which he has been describing for the last decade, really, with very

specific detail. That may get beyond the point of control by either

South Korea, the United States, or our friends who are involved.

So there is a special urgency here.

My question, I suppose, to the three of you is, if you were visiting,

and you may, with the special envoy, how are we able to

make the point to the South Korean administrations, present and

future, that the urgency of hearing about trucks going along the

road, about the potential lifting of rods, the building of weapons

even as we think about this, why is that that important?

As you have pointed out, Ambassador Bosworth, the South Koreans

could calculate that a North Korea with nuclear weapons is

certainly not a good thing, but, on the other hand, all things considered,

that our feelings, the United States’ feelings, about our security,

weapons of mass destruction, the intersection with terrorists,

is our situation, and they may sympathize with that, but they

are not really clear that is all that big of a deal as far as they are

concerned.

I do not depreciate that, but I would suggest that we have two

different timetables going on here, I think. Those of us who are

genuinely worried, and I hope all of us are, about weapons of mass

destruction, or materials that bring about those weapons falling in

to the hands of terrorists of other regimes, of trades and transactions,

that this is our national security, this is the ball game.

Now, that is proceeding, even day by day, and yet it seems to me,

in terms of our diplomatic strategy, the timetable is much less precise,

and, as a matter of fact, does not exist at all, except stability

for the new regime in South Korea. We hope somehow the Chinese

come to a different point of view, the Russians might be more helpful,

ditto for the Japanese, everybody, with the North Koreans, it

seems to me, precisely rebuffing each of these entrees, indicating,

‘‘We’re not interested in you. We’re interested in the United

States.’’ That is the talk we want to have.

How do we get this together with the South Koreans quickly, because

for us to proceed in these direct talks, as all of us are advising,

we run the dangers still of perhaps not having the sensitivity

we need toward the South Korean viewpoint, which may be distinctly

different, or falling through the transition of the administrations,

or various other things. And, as you pointed out, Ambassador

Bosworth, from your own experience with these negotiators from

North Korea, it is very discouraging.

It is all well and good for us to talk about having talks. I have

not had nearly so many with difficult people in the world as the

three of you have had, but we have talked to a lot of very difficult

people, dangerous people, people that are not good people, people

that are evil. And we have talked to all these people because we

thought, conceivably, something good for the United States and the

world might come from that.

Can you offer some more enlightenment, any of the three of you,

in response to this plea, really, for assistance?

With South Korea.

Ambassador Bosworth.

Do you have a further thought, Mr. Gregg.

Well, I thank you, all three of you, for this advice.

I gleaned that you would say to the South Korean emissary,

first of all, that we believe that these talks between our two countries

are tremendously important. They need to be constant. We

really have to go into a crash course of learning where we are now.

But as Secretary Carter has pointed out, make the point to the

South Koreans that nuclear weapons in North Korea probably

caused them a cause for alarm, in terms of their own stability they

may or may not have perceived—fully perceive this. But at least

I think that is an important point, that we are going to talk, if we

have these talks, for all three of us, the Japanese abductees issue

and others that may come into the thing. But then to recognize

that we have some work to do with our own policy, as Ambassador

Bosworth has pointed out.

We have to determine what we want. Now, I think what we want

is a termination of the weapons of mass destruction program, really

a cleanup of the whole lot, international inspections so that we are convinced.

It seems to me that that is clearly what we want, but that is—

may be just a personal preference. I think it is such an extraordinary

point, though, with regard to our overall war against terrorism,

the overall security of the United States, as we have talked

about, that this may very well be a point that others could agree upon.

And, finally, I appreciate the point that Secretary Carter has

made. Whether it is called a Nunn-Lugar program or not, there

may come a time in which the cleanup is expensive. If you were

to go about rendering safe all of this, the resources are probably

not there in North Korea to do it any more than they are in the

former Soviet Union. And we still have trouble making that point

annually with regard to chemical weapons or other situations that

we are working through. But it is probably important to start, because

if, in fact, there is to be safety for the North Koreans, the

South Koreans, for us, for everybody else, that probably is going to

require a very concerted effort on our part, including technicians,

finances, and a multi-year training to get the job done. Senator Biden.

OK. Senator Dodd.

Thank you.

Senator Biden.

Well, that is a high compliment.

Let me just conclude by—I am struck with the

two phrases that came up frequently, particularly in the last panel,

the ‘‘what went wrong’’ idea. This very room has been filled with

the joint intelligence committees in the last Congress trying to determine

what went wrong on September 11, what went wrong in

terms of our perceptions, our policy, our preparedness, and our

ability, really, to understand the changes that ought to be made.

And that work continues with the special commission, with the intelligence

committees having been discharged from that.

But it brought to the fore, in another way, the work of Bernard

Lewis, ‘‘What Went Wrong,’’ the book that he wrote, as to why we

do not understand Islam and what happened in Islam throughout

this period, why they have got real problems that they do not understand.

These are really profound circumstances.

And I would just submit that even given all the arguments that

might occur in this current administration, one thing that went

wrong for a long time was that the American people lost interest

in foreign policy, and so did many of their leaders in this Congress.

For many years, people were interested and continue to be interested

in healthcare and education for the American people, the ups

and downs of our economy and jobs issues, and any one of us who

is an elected politician needs to understand that. This is what people

want to talk about.

Well, occasionally, you may have 15 minutes at

the end of the public forum to talk about what is going on in the

rest of the world.

So it is not just a question that Afghanistan fell off the charts,

and—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, never were there, but even with

countries as important as Korea and Japan and so forth. Many

Americans lost track of what is going on out there.

Now suddenly we have reaped some of that problem, not just

with our leadership, but with a constituency that the President

must appeal to, that all of us must appeal to, to understand why

this is important and why we are not in the phase of the Korean

war, the last Korean war, or some other situation.

Now, it is a catch-up, but this is the purpose of the hearing. It

is not simply for Senators, but it is for the American people who

are interested in this. And we appreciate your testimony, which

will have a wider audience, I think, as you appreciate.

The other thing that strikes me in the regime-change idea—I

came up, of all things, in a rather obscure piece of legislation—I

think it was obscure, because I do not remember much debate—but

in the Congress before President Bush got here, or his group, the

Congress said ‘‘Regime change is our policy.’’ Now, President Bush

latched onto that in a couple of public statements early on, while

all of the reviews are going on. And when asked, in a flip way,

maybe he would say ‘‘regime change, that’s what we’re about.’’

Well, not necessarily.

But the problem is one—I think the historical mention by Don

Gregg of his work in CIA and regime change of the past and why

that became outmoded—is very, very helpful, and that is an introduction

today that is important for us to take a look at, because

now it is obviously apparent in the North Korean situation, at least

as I listen to the President, that is not what he has on his mind.

But I thank the Senator for mentioning the fact that the President

does appear to be open to ideas, and as I mentioned in response

to Senator Dodd earlier, Senator Biden and I will have another

chance to visit tomorrow morning at 7, albeit an early hour,

a fairly small group on a rather fateful day in American history,

as our Secretary of State testifies. And I mention, again, that the

Secretary will testify there on Wednesday. But, nevertheless, he

will be here on Thursday. That will be a rare privilege for the committee

and, I think, the American people, once again, to hear him,

have a chance to question him, as we will.

Senator Chafee, does your reappearance signal a desire to question?

Thank you very much. We thank the witnesses.

And the hearing is adjourned.